Complexities of Philippine security decision-making regarding a contingency in Taiwan

The views expressed by the author in this article are solely her own (unless otherwise stated) and do not in any way represent the official policy or position of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any other institution with which she is affiliated.

Given the recent developments in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, such as rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the Philippines has found itself in the spotlight as it shifts from a pro-China stance under the Duterte administration returns to strengthening its security alliance with the United States under the Marcos Jr. government. With the country’s geographic proximity to Taiwan and its strategic location connecting the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, questions arise over how the country will maintain its own national security interests while tackling the US-China rivalry navigates centrally in the strategic calculations of the Philippine defense establishment. , especially regarding an unforeseen event in Taiwan. Increasing Chinese aggressiveness in the maritime domain, coupled with rising tensions among Strasbourg citizens, has also highlighted important security conversations in the country, particularly around competing national and local interests, and identifying and protecting against malign influence operations.

As a country where its prime geostrategic location in the region has been both a boon and a bane for strategic and military planning, the Philippines’ supreme political-security interests are the defense of its territorial integrity and sovereignty; the protection of the lives, livelihoods and freedom of the Filipino people; supporting the country’s commitment to uphold international law and the rules-based order, and contributing to regional peace and stability. As these interests are increasingly challenged by China’s coercive diplomatic, political, military, and economic activities, the Chinese defense establishment has shifted its strategic priorities from a decades-long focus on internal security to external defense. Now at “Re-horizon 3” of its modernization program, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has committed to acquiring capabilities that will enhance their domain awareness, connectivity, intelligence and reconnaissance, and area denial and deterrence capabilities in both the country’s and areas of the country will increase. external maritime and air domains. In addition, the Ministry of National Defense has committed to developing its “comprehensive archipelago defense concept,” which is designed to ensure that the country benefits from the natural resources located within its exclusive economic zone, and to “enable it project power into areas that need to be protected and preserved.”

Furthermore, in light of increasing aggressive activities by Chinese forces against the Philippine government and civilian fishing vessels in the South China Sea, the Philippines has stepped up other defensive measures, including strengthening its security alliance with the United States. In addition to developing unilateral contingency plans in response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the Philippines continues to strengthen its security partnerships, especially with the United States, for the defense of the archipelago. The recently agreed locations in Northern Luzon under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will allow the Philippines to plan and implement more effective and efficient defensive measures in coordination with the United States, if only to protect its territory should China decides to invade Taiwan. Contrary to Chinese statements and analyzes that the Philippines is merely a US “pawn” in provoking China with these recent developments under EDCA, the country’s decision to strengthen its security alliance with the United States should be understood as the prerogative of a sovereign nation to increase its defense against repeated invasions of its territory, and to increase its aggression against its people.

Furthermore, the Philippines is currently at the center of deepening its partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific. The annual Balikatan exercises, the most prominent bilateral joint military exercise between the Philippines and the United States, have steadily expanded to include the participation of other US allies in the region, such as Australia and Japan, and other like-minded regional militaries under its International Observer Program . In addition to the Visiting Forces Agreements the country has signed with the United States and Australia, the Philippines is also negotiating a reciprocal access agreement with Japan aimed at improving cooperation and interoperability between the AFP and partner forces.

However, it should be noted that the imperatives of its security alliance with the United States and its economic advantages and geographical proximity to China significantly complicate the way Manila shapes its defense policy and strategy. Furthermore, the Philippines is a status quo power and has no intention of “rocking the boat” by developing official relations with Taiwan; it adheres to a One China policy as enshrined in the Joint Communiqué between the Philippines and China signed in 1975. Although there have been recent individual engagements between some Philippine politicians and Taiwanese leaders, such as Senator Risa Hontiveros’ visit to President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan and President Marcos’ controversial congratulatory tweet to Taiwan’s newly elected President Lai Ching-te do not necessarily translate into diplomatic support from the Philippines for Taiwan, nor into official security cooperation at the operational level. The Philippine defense establishment insists it is not pursuing official military ties with Taiwan in light of its One China policy, and will not attempt to do so in the near future.

However, this does not rule out the prospects of Philippine support for the US forces in the event of an unforeseen event in Taiwan. With nearly 200,000 Filipinos in Taiwan, it is in the Philippines’ interest to closely monitor Strasbourg relations and deploy military installations in the northernmost regions for rescue and repatriation missions ahead of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Moreover, it is in the best interest of the Philippines to maintain the status quo as a major conflict will have enormous consequences, such as refugee flows and possible spillover of the conflict into Philippine territory. Furthermore, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan will also mean that China has effectively established control over the Luzon Strait, among other strategic waterways within the First Island chain, and that there will be increasing pressure from Beijing, not just on the country’s west coast , but also in the country. north of the archipelago.

The sheer complexity of the country’s position has been debated in security policy and academic circles within and outside the Philippines. The debate has not only permeated strategic conversations at the national level, but also at the local level, especially in provinces where military installations will be established under the EDCA. Some scholars describe this as the “localization of US-China rivalry,” which has significantly changed national-local political dynamics and security decision-making in the Philippines, pitting national security interests against local economic development (Despi, 2023). Cagayan, one of the closest provinces to Taiwan, is an example of this. With plans to draw investments from China, Cagayan Governor Manuel Mamba views recent developments in the US-Philippines alliance as unfavorable to his province’s interests. Mamba, a well-known pro-China politician, has actively opposed the US presence in Cagayan and managed to prevent live-fire exercises between the Philippines, the US and other allies during the replays of the Balikatan and Kamandag military exercises in 2022 (Despi, 2023). Security experts note that Cagayan based his opposition to the live-fire exercises on three main points: that it would create a diplomatic issue with China; that the province may become embroiled in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait; and that US military activities in the area could jeopardize potential Chinese investments. Here we can see that the willingness of local government actors to promote the interests of their province highlights susceptibility to foreign influence, which may prove detrimental to national security interests in the long run.

Though long overdue, we can also see an increase in discussions in Philippine security circles over China’s malign interference and how the country’s “influence operations” have allowed it to penetrate certain provinces and regions from Luzon to Mindanao. Many look to Taiwan for insights into this, where these disinformation campaigns and propaganda activities to undermine democratic institutions and processes have long existed. As for the Philippines, in addition to its efforts to expose China’s aggressive “gray zone” activities in the political, economic, military and cyber/information domains, the government is now working towards the passage of a law against foreign interference to take precautions. against coercive and influence operations that threaten to undermine the country’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.

These important debates open a door for possible (unofficial) cooperation between Taiwan and the Philippines, as both feel the impact of Chinese coercive measures in different areas. After the successful elections, Taiwan could provide Philippine institutions with significant insight into countering malign interference in democratic processes. Finally, while official military cooperation is off the table, other possible security cooperation activities include educational exchanges and discussions on increasing resilience against the myriad measures of Chinese malign influence and political interference, especially cyber attacks, and influence operations targeting government agencies in the country. the national and subnational level.

Additional works cited

Despi, D. (2023, July 21). The Influence of China’s Economic Statecraft on Philippine Security Decision Making: The Case of Cagayan Province. COP, AFP Colloquium on Military Education