Affairs and guarantees | eKathimerini.com

If I had the chance to talk to the ‘European diplomat’ who is supposedly strongly advocating Greece’s supply of air defense systems to Ukraine, I would tell them this: Greece would indeed consider such assistance if the European Union unequivocally commits to it undertakes to ensure the security of our country – an unwavering commitment, comparable to what the British call a ‘strong security commitment’. Unfortunately, such a commitment is lacking and NATO cannot provide one as it would mean involving another NATO member.

Moreover, the “European diplomat” should recognize that Greece does not share borders with Austria or France, nor does it simply share a lake with a neighboring country. Instead, Greece borders a country that questions the sovereignty of the Greek islands and until recently conducted overflights over them. The transfer of Greece’s air defense systems to Ukraine, or any other country, should therefore be conditional on a commitment to replace them with similar systems, with the certainty that Greece will not bear the financial burden.

If a “US diplomat” were involved in the same discussion, I would convey exactly the same sentiments, as the relevant US commitment remains confidential and to some extent ambiguous. I would further like to emphasize that the rewards Greece has received for its position in the Ukraine crisis and its consent to the transfer of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara have been disappointing. This is despite the significant political costs that the Greek government must bear as a result. A good example is the surplus US military ships that the Defense Department leadership rightly rejected.

In addition, I refer to a comment by a seasoned analyst of American policy in our region, who recently joked that there must be something in the water of every newcomer to the State Department that compels them to approach Turkey with awe or fear of his country. potential to distance itself from the West. Their observation was drawn from Turkey’s positions in both Ukraine and the Middle East, alongside those of Greece.

Certain Northern diplomats may dismiss the above reasoning as merely Balkan, possibly even banal. However, it is we who must navigate life in a dangerous neighborhood fraught with countless threats, while at the same time anticipating that our status as a loyal member of the Western Alliance entitles us to a certain degree of protection. Last but not least, let us not overlook the fact that our northern allies engaged with Moscow and demonstrated total dependence on it for years, seemingly ignoring the geopolitical consequences. Moreover, it is precisely these allies who are likely to resume business with Moscow once the Ukraine chapter is concluded.