Investiture of the new, old Russian government. What to expect? Op-ed by Anatol Țăranu

	For the Republic of Moldova, the long-term continuation of the war in Ukraine is a worrying prognosis, full of risks that are difficult to foresee. Moscow’s attempts to politically destabilize Moldova by activating the separatist conflicts in Transnistria and Gagauzia will certainly continue. Political and financial support for the fifth column within Moldovan society will be maintained and increased, while the risk of expansion of Russian military aggression towards the Republic of Moldova will remain...
Anatol Țăranu

After the pompous inauguration in his fifth term as president, Vladimir Putin reappointed Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister of the Russian government as well as most members of the old composition of civilian ministers – appointments that seemed predictable and even disappointingly predictable. But in some cases, the Russian president managed to surprise everyone, especially when he fired Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was transferred to the post of Secretary of the Security Council, replacing the influential Nikolai Patrushev. Another surprise was Andrei Belousov, who was somewhat surprisingly transferred from the post of First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs to the post of Minister of Defense.

Russia lost more than 1 million lives due to pandemic

The international press is rich with the most contradictory statements and predictions about the latest metamorphoses within the Russian government team. For example, experts from the prestigious agency The Bell have conducted an assessment of Mishustin’s first term as prime minister, which sounds surprisingly positive. At the same time, not a few media wrote that Mishustin’s first appointment as head of the Russian government, which had to change something in the administration after a long stagnation under the leadership of Medvedev, coincided with the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. But the Russian government’s response to the challenge of the pandemic was a complete failure. Russia lost more than 1 million lives to the pandemic, more than any country in the world as a percentage of its population. No country in the world has handled COVID worse than Russia. In addition, one of Mishustin’s deputies, who blocked the use of Western vaccines, has now received money for a dubious Russian vaccine.

A special place in the press reports is occupied by the observation that Russia invaded Ukraine during Mishustin’s premiership in February 2022, forced a million people to leave the country in the period 2022-2023 and switched to a “war economy” in which increased arms production is financed by reducing consumption and the quality of life of citizens. The true costs of this transition have yet to be determined, while Russia’s political elite shows no signs of ending the war.

Incompetence and corruption became proverbial

At the same time, since the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, enough complaints have accumulated among the Russian Z-patriots against the former Minister of War Shoigu, who failed to occupy Kiev “within three days”, while the Russian showed his unpreparedness for a full-scale war, just as the incompetence and corruption of the Russian military leadership became proverbial. Even the occupation of Bakhmut and Avdiivka did not change the negative attitude towards the former minister. Even though Putin values ​​loyalty more than professionalism, in Shoigu’s case it was believed that retaining the post of Defense Minister would have more damaging consequences than the resignation of a loyal minister, especially since this resignation meets the expectations of broad layers of Russian society. . The arrest of Shoigu’s deputy and confidant, Timur Ivanov, on corruption charges was one of the signs of the expected resignation.

During the two years of war, Shoigu has become the most toxic figure in the Russian leadership, so it is unlikely that he will succeed in becoming the second Patrushev, while the status of Secretary of the Security Council will remain only an honorary exile. With much the same logic, Putin once removed the no less poisonous Dmitry Medvedev from the government. Russian experts write that Shoigu’s departure from the Defense Ministry comes as a shock to the generals. Even if Shoigu was not harshly punished, but merely moved to an honorable position at the Security Council, many of his subordinates who are involved in various corruption schemes alongside their former boss are at risk of being treated differently. And Shoigu will no longer be able to protect them because, despite his new prestigious position as Secretary of the Security Council, in reality he will no longer have any real power or significant financial resources.

Fall ‘architects’ indicate a redistribution of influence

Putin has nominated Andrei Belousov, a former deputy prime minister and civilian economist, for the post of defense minister. Officially, this choice of the Russian President is explained by the need for the Minister of Defense to be absolutely open to innovation and new ideas in ensuring the needs of the military. But many experts are inclined to conclude that the new defense secretary will find it difficult to understand the needs of the military – because of his lack of military experience. It is unlikely that the military company will enthusiastically accept the new minister-economist, especially since everyone under the new manager expects an audit and purges on corruption grounds. With this appointment, Putin makes clear that he wants a more pragmatic, non-corrupt and professional approach to the needs of the military. But there is no guarantee that this experiment will necessarily work under the conditions of endemic corruption in the Russian military.

An even more controversial decision is the transfer of Nikolai Patrushevs from the all-powerful position of Secretary of the Security Council to the position of Advisor to the President on issues related to shipbuilding. Patrushev, 72, is a close friend of Putin. He served as his deputy in the presidential administration and then at the FSB in the late 1990s. Patrushev has been called the ‘architect’ of the invasion of Ukraine. According to sources in The Times and The Wall Street Journal, it was Patrushev who convinced Putin to start the war in Ukraine, arguing that the United States was preparing to attack Russia and that Moscow should launch a “preemptive strike.”

Experts assess Patrushev’s new appointment as “a serious instrumental defeat” and an “honorable retirement”, recalling that the positions of the former Secretary of the Security Council collapsed after the uprising of the private military company Wagner, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It was the duty of the Security Council to prevent such riots, with this body being responsible for extradepartmental coordination between the agencies responsible for state security. But it was in this mission that Patrushev failed. At the same time, Patrushev’s fall signals a redistribution of functional influence among traditional clans at the top of the state pyramid and a significant reduction in the number of influential members of the informal group called “Putin’s Politbiro.”

For a long war against Ukraine

The restructuring of Russian public management, recently organized by Putin, aims to optimize Russia’s current political paradigm, but not to change it. All of Putin’s reshuffles directly indicate that he wants to strengthen the current power configuration and uses the change of government only to increase the effectiveness of what already exists, but not for new approaches. According to analysts at the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), such changes indicate that the Kremlin is trying to optimize the Russian economy and especially the industrial base of the defense sector in order to support a protracted war against Ukraine. . This may also indicate the possible readiness of the Russian Federation for military operations against the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The fact that Putin is not ready for the shift in the political paradigm that led to the war in Ukraine is also reflected in his decision to fire Aleksandr Bortnikov and Sergei Naryshkin, the heads of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). ), respectively. Sergey Lavrov, the country’s veteran foreign minister, will also remain in office. This personnel policy pursued by Putin points to the Russian leader’s confidence in his own abilities, but also to the fact that he intends to continue the war policy indefinitely.

Risky forecast for Moldova

For the Republic of Moldova, the long-term continuation of the war in Ukraine is a worrying prognosis, full of risks that are difficult to foresee. Moscow’s attempts to politically destabilize Moldova by activating the separatist conflicts in Transnistria and Gagauzia will certainly continue. Political and financial support for the fifth column within Moldovan society will be maintained and increased, while the risk of expansion of Russian military aggression into the Republic of Moldova will remain. In such a situation, it is difficult to expect a sustainable economic recovery that can contribute to positive changes in the social status of large parts of the population.

And this already poses great risks for the survival of the pro-European government, with the possibility of anti-European and pro-Moscow political forces returning to power in the Republic of Moldova. Against this background, the revival of the Union project is becoming increasingly likely, as the only solution to save Moldova east of the Prut River from the imperialist revisionism of Putin’s Russia and to integrate this space into the EU by politically returning to the composition of Romania. .

IPN publishes opinion pieces submitted by authors who are not affiliated with our editorial team in the Op-Ed section. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily reflect the opinions of our editorial staff.

Anatol Țăranu