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RU large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting energy infrastructure

Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 7 to 8, continuing to exploit Ukraine’s degraded air defense umbrella ahead of the arrival of US and Western security assistance at scale.

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched 21 Shahed-136/131 drones and 55 missiles, including 45 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, four Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, an Iskander-K ballistic missile, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and a Kh-47 “Kinzhal” aeroballistic missile.(1) Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 33 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, all four Kalibr cruise missiles, both Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 20 Shaheds.(2)

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko reported that Russian forces struck electricity generation and transmission facilities in Poltava, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts.(3) Ukraine’s largest private energy operator DTEK reported that Russian forces attacked three unspecified thermal power plants (TPPs) in Ukraine and seriously damaged unspecified equipment.(4) Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo spokesperson Maria Tsaturyan stated that regional energy authorities will implement shutdowns evenly across all oblasts in Ukraine due to energy shortages and warned that the Ukrenergo control center will issue a command for emergency shutdowns throughout Ukraine if consumption continues to grow in the evening.(5) Ukrainian state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces also targeted railway infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, forcing railway administrators to reduce train travel along the Kyiv-Kherson and Kyiv-Mykolaiv routes.(6) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that it targeted Ukrainian energy facilities and defense industrial enterprises in order to reduce Ukraine’s ability to produce military equipment and transfer Western equipment to the frontline.(7)

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This is the fifth large scale Russian missile and drone strike targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since March 22, 2024, as the Russian military has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid and constrain Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity.(8) Russian forces will likely continue to conduct mass strikes to cause long-term damage to Ukrainian energy infrastructure as degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities persist until the arrival of US-provided air defense missiles and other Western air defense assets at scale.(9) Russian forces have also intensified strikes against Ukrainian transportation infrastructure in recent weeks in an apparent effort to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and constrain the flow of expected US security assistance to the frontline.(10) Russian forces have continued to heavily target Ukrainian energy facilities in limited larger missile and drone strike series, however, suggesting that Russia is either prioritizing the effort to collapse the energy grid over interdiction efforts or must use a larger number of missiles to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses near energy facilities and cause significant damage to these facilities.

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  • Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 7 to 8, continuing to exploit Ukraine’s degraded air defense umbrella ahead of the arrival of US and Western security assistance at scale.
  • Recent satellite imagery of depleted Russian military vehicle and weapons storage facilities further indicates that Russia is currently sustaining its war effort largely by pulling from storage rather than by manufacturing new vehicles and certain weapons at scale.
  • Russia is relying on vast Soviet-era stores of vehicles and other equipment to sustain operations and losses in Ukraine at a level far higher than the current Russian DIB could support, nor will Russia be able to mobilize its DIB to replenish these stores for many years .
  • The Georgian State Security Service (SUS) is employing standard Kremlin information operations against Georgians protesting Georgia’s Russian-style “foreign agents” bill following the lead of Georgian Dream party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili.
  • Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia are increasingly forcing the Kremlin to acknowledge issues in the bilateral relationship.
  • Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė stated that the Lithuanian government has granted permission for Lithuania to send troops to Ukraine for training missions in the future.
  • Reports indicate that there is an available open-source tool that allows people to search by specific coordinates for Telegram users who have enabled a certain location-sharing setting.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to highlight Russian formations involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Long Range Aviation Command (LRA) has increased the lethality of its premier Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) by operationally fielding the AS-23 KODIAK fitted with a second warhead.The LRA Command has sought to modify its systems and tactics throughout the conflict to: increase survivability as too many missiles were being intercepted by Ukrainian air defense systems;  enhance capabilities to have greater effect;  and use up older missiles as the VKS had depleted more modern systems in the early days of the conflict.  This latest modification has likely reduced the range of the AS-23 by half.  The LRA does not need the full range to hit all of Ukraine.  The second warhead is designed for increased fragmentation at the target.  It is likely that this will make the system more effective in striking non-hardened targets.
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Russian forces recently made significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka and recently advanced elsewhere west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced roughly four kilometers north of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) towards the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka and Ocheretyne) and that Ukrainian forces do not maintain positions on the northwestern outskirts of Ocheretyne .(57) Additional geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak south of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).(58) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Novokalynove (north of Avdiivka), and ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of May 4.(59) Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Ocheretyne towards Prohres and up to 1.5 kilometers in depth towards Novopokrovske, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.(60) Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Avdiivka near Oleksandropil; northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Arkhanhelske, Yevhenivka, and Sokil; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka, Novoselivka Persha, Umanske, and Netaylove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Vodyane.(61) Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st AC) are reported operating near Netaylove.(62)

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