New data points to political repression, slowing the economy and fueling irregular Chinese migration to the US

Introduction

Despite intense interest from lawmakers and the media about Chinese migration through the southern border, reliable data sources on these migrants are limited.

One of the available sources is the annually updated Ecuadorian Statistical Register of International Entries and Exits. This database provides valuable insight into the characteristics of Chinese migrants entering Ecuador, the only mainland country in the Western Hemisphere to offer visa-free travel to Chinese nationals.

Since most Chinese migrants enter America through Ecuador, this data can reasonably be used to draw conclusions about irregular Chinese migration. This assumption is supported by net entry/exit data, which shows that Chinese nationals entered Ecuador 48,381 times in 2023, but left only 24,240 times. The resulting inflow/outflow deficit was 24,141 – by far the highest of any nationality.

Several other data points from the latest release, which summarizes 2023 international entries, further strengthen our knowledge of irregular Chinese migration. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show that encounters with Chinese nationals have increased sharply in recent years. This increase is mirrored by Ecuadorian travel data, which shows that 23,859 Chinese nationals traveled to Ecuador at least once in 2023, an increase of almost 235% compared to the previous five-year average.

However, some of the new data points complicate our assumptions about who these migrants are.

Areas under repression remain overrepresented

Our analysis of last year’s data found that Hong Kong and in the Ecuadorian access data.

This finding is echoed in this year’s data, with Hong Kong having the second highest number of trips to Ecuador per million inhabitants and Xinjiang the sixth.

Hong Kong can be explained to some extent by the region’s relatively high economic development, the presence of airports and the overall population, making frequent business trips and overrepresentation in the import data plausible.

However, two consecutive years of high proportional numbers from Xinjiang defy easy explanation. The high number of travelers from Aksu and Altay prefectures has a major impact on Xinjiang’s figures. Aksu is 80% Uyghur, while Altay is majority Kazakh – which could indicate that travelers from this region may not be Han Chinese or at least have first-hand knowledge of the CCP’s system of repression in this region.

It is reasonable to assume that travelers from Xinjiang are likely traveling to Ecuador to escape CCP persecution. Moreover, every traveler from Aksu and Altay who chose to list their travel motive chose ‘residence’ instead of tourism, public transport or business.

However, the numbers from this dataset need to be stronger to indicate that persecution is a necessary driver of irregular travel from China to Ecuador. Only two provinces saw no travel to Ecuador in 2022 and 2023: Qinghai, which is only 51% Han Chinese, and the Tibet Autonomous Region, which is 86% ethnic Tibetan.

Both provinces have suffered widespread human rights abuses but still do not have the same levels of outbound travel as Xinjiang and Hong Kong. This suggests that other factors beyond possible social, religious and political concerns are also important in determining whether a region has high levels of irregular emigration.

Falling northeastern regions are also high

China’s northeastern ‘rust belt’ provinces have experienced significant population decline in recent years, losing 30% of their population between 2010 and 2020.

In this region, despite their sharply declining populations, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning all rank in the top third of origin regions among Chinese travelers to Ecuador, adjusted for population, as indicated by an asterisk in this table.

Region	2023 Travel speed to Ecuador per million
Shanghai Municipality	274
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	257
Beijing Municipality	161
Heilongjiang Province*	123
Fujian Province	28
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	24
Macau Special Administrative Region	19
Jilin Province*	19
Hubei Province	11
Shaanxi Province	11
Liaoning Province*	9
	Source: Author table with data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Registro Estadístico de Entradas y Salidas 2023

These regional considerations that increasing political persecution in China and a slowing economy are likely contributing to irregular migration are supported by the broader Chinese demographic profile derived from Ecuadorian travel data.

Most travelers are male, middle class, under 40 years old

Chinese migrants encountered at the U.S.-Mexico border are often ominously referred to as “military-age men.”

These data confirm the fact that the migrants are largely young and male. In 2023, 71% of Chinese newcomers to Ecuador were male, and 55% were between 15 and 39 years old. Three factors almost certainly explain these demographic developments, and none indicate a risk to national security.

First, China has significant gender inequality due to its one-child policy, making it difficult for many men to find a woman to marry. The pressure created by this imbalance has already created a market for human trafficking within China, and it is reasonable to assume that young Chinese men might be motivated to undertake the journey if they believe it will make it easier to to find a husband.

Secondly, social media has made the otherwise logistically difficult journey much more manageable and attractive, and young people are more likely to feel comfortable using social media to navigate the journey.

Finally, young middle-class men in China are among the demographic groups most likely to have the resources and ability to organize and complete the expensive and grueling route to the US via Ecuador.

Occupational data of newcomers to Ecuador confirm this statement: almost 80% were high- or medium-skilled professionals, while less than 1% (and only two in total) mentioned ‘military’ as their field of activity.

Conclusion

There is no single unique characteristic that explains why more and more asylum seekers from China are reporting to the southern border. Stifling political repression, a slowing Chinese economy, the rise of social media as a conduit for irregular travel, and a perceived limited window of opportunity are all compounding factors that combine to produce the record 24,376 encounters with Chinese nationals recorded by the US CBP in FY 2024. easier to understand so far.

One popular explanation favored by some commentators is that these Chinese migrants are spies. As we explained earlier, this interpretation is highly questionable.

American policymakers interested in effectively pushing back on the CCP should instead reject their assumption that every ethnic Chinese person owes them allegiance and aggressively promote practical, bipartisan solutions that protect anti-communist dissidents and promote American democracy as an alternative worldview promote.

Olivia Enos of the Hudson Institute has made a compelling case for stepping up enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, and the Global Magnitsky Act to address CCP human rights abuses.

At the level of immigration policy, the US should allow Chinese dissidents greater access to our refugee system. This can be done by passing the Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act and the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, which would allow dissidents from these areas to benefit from Priority Two (P-2) processing in the refugee resettlement system, thus allowing them to enter the U.S. refugee system can enter. program without a referral from the UNHCR, an embassy or an NGO.

Despite their authoritarian structure, the CCP has no control over the narrative of irregular Chinese migration to the US. Whether the US decides to shape this narrative before it shapes us in the eyes of people seeking freedom in China, East Asia and the world remains to be seen. us.