The helicopter flare-up should underline China’s basic instincts

The Chinese Air Force’s dangerous interception of a Royal Australian Navy helicopter in the Yellow Sea – what the Ministry of Defense calls an “unprofessional interaction” in which flares were fired near the helicopter – is the latest in a series of actions of the Chinese army. It includes lasering an RAN ship, firing chaff that was absorbed into the engine of an RAAF aircraft, and pulsing sonar near an Australian ship when its divers were in the water. The US and Canadian militaries have experienced similar incidents.

In other words, this appears to be a clear pattern of behavior endorsed by high levels of the Chinese military, and not the work of overzealous pilots or low-level commanders.

My response to last year’s sonar incident remains my opinion today. Australia should strongly protest this behavior to the Chinese government and consider non-military ways to respond. Some have suggested expelling Chinese diplomats from the country, although that is a high-profile move that would undoubtedly lead to a tit-for-tat response and derail the recovery of economic ties. So, as I said at the time of the sonar incident, these episodes serve an illuminating function: they force Australia to ask itself what it really cares about in relations with China.

In other words, the balance of forces is extremely unfavorable for Australia.

One thing Australia cannot do is think in terms of direct military responses. When the Australian military operates in the South China Sea or the Yellow Sea, it is far from home and therefore isolated. China, on the other hand, has bases, ships and aircraft nearby, and can call on any number of resources if such an incident escalates. In other words, the balance of forces is extremely unfavorable for Australia.

This raises a broader point about China’s military capabilities, which have been exaggerated in some quarters, lending a tone of panic to Australia’s defense debate. A new report from the US think tank Defense Priorities makes clear and compelling that Chinese naval power poses an overwhelming threat to other countries when operating near China. China’s ability to operate far from home, including as far away as Australia, is much more limited.

The report notes a number of shortcomings. China has made tremendous progress in naval modernization over the past three decades, but still lags far behind in nuclear-powered submarine technology, which is critical to “blue water” maritime operations. And if you want to deploy warships at long range, they have to be refueled, resupplied and rearmed at sea, but China has also invested too little in supply ships. The most important judgments are clear and powerful:

China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases to support large-scale People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) blue-water operations… Without such a base network, the PLAN is dependent on naval replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China has some quality supply ships at sea, but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations.

Even a huge fleet of supply ships cannot replace naval bases and friendly ports where ships can repair and rearm, and crews can rest. According to the report, China has only two naval bases away from home – one in Djibouti and the second in Cambodia, although they are both small and it remains unclear whether China plans to permanently base troops at both bases.

Nevertheless, we must assume that two overseas naval bases do not mark the limit of Chinese ambition. If Australia wants to ensure that China can never project significant military power in our immediate region, the task must be to permanently frustrate those ambitions.

So if Australia really wants to take strong action against Chinese incitement, such as the Navy helicopter incident, then this may be the area we should focus on. With any Chinese provocation, Australia could announce a new initiative with a Pacific or Southeast Asian neighbor, the overall goal of which will always be the same: to strengthen diplomatic and defense cooperation in ways that erode the likelihood that these countries would ever consider hosting. Chinese military facilities.